

THE BELLUM ACHAICUM AND ITS SOCIAL ASPECT

The last stand of the Greeks against Rome before Greece sank into the limbo of the Roman Empire is to some a truly patriotic rising, to others a misguided attempt at the impossible. Whatever their general estimation, most scholars have recognised social traits in the Achaian War and in the events which immediately preceded it.

To Kahrstedt it was 'bolschewistisches Fahrwasser . . . Massenmord der Besitzenden und Gebildeten . . . Ausrottung der Bourgeoisie . . . eine reine Proletarierrepublik, ein Kampf gegen die eigenen Bourgeois und gegen die kapitalistische italische Grossmacht'.¹ Colin sees in the events of 147/6 B.C. traits of 'une révolution sociale'.² According to Fustel de Coulanges, 'ils abolissent les dettes, ou tout au moins en diffèrent le payement. Ils affranchissent et arment les esclaves'.³ To Oertel, it was 'sozialistische Bewegung . . . die Ziele sind die alten'.⁴ According to Pöhlmann, 'selbst in die letzte grosse politische Krisis der Nation . . . spielt die sozialdemokratische Bewegung mächtig hinein'.⁵ In the view of Benecke 'the masses in the Greek cities were encouraged by promises of a social revolution, and the . . . Achaean general Critolaus did not dare to disappoint them'.⁶ According to Rostovtzeff, the aim of Rome in the destruction of Corinth was 'to put an end to social and economic revolution'.⁷ Other authorities, such as Niese, Mommsen, De Sanctis, Tarn, Niccolini, note social traits in their accounts of the events of 147/6 B.C. without attempting a general view of the place of the social factor in the Achaian War.⁸

Now, there certainly was a social aspect to the Bellum Achaicum. However, this aspect of the events of 147/6 B.C. has never been adequately discussed, and the sources bearing on it have not been subjected to a detailed analysis.

The following is an attempt at an evaluation of the social aspect of the Bellum Achaicum.

For the story of the years 147/6 B.C. I refer to the accounts of Niese, and, especially, of De Sanctis, and restrict myself to recalling to mind only the main facts.⁹

In 150 B.C. there flared up one of the interminable quarrels between Sparta and the Achaian League. The case was in and out of the senate, until in spring 148 B.C. Sparta declared her secession from the League. War against Sparta was pressed hard by the League and in the summer of 147 B.C. Sparta was on the verge of surrender. At this juncture a Roman embassy, headed by Lucius Aurelius Orestes, arrived in Corinth. The Roman ruling, announced by Orestes, not only backed Sparta's secession, but also recognised the right of secession for all states not originally Achaian, Corinth and Argos being specifically mentioned. This was tantamount, in fact, to breaking up the Achaian League. Spartans who happened to be in Corinth, were nearly lynched, and the residence of the Roman envoys was ransacked. This was a break between Achaia and Rome. Another

¹ GGA clxxxviii (1926) 124 f., cf. also *id.* *Hellas-Jahrbuch* (1929) 111: 'die soziale Revolution vier- undzwanzig Stunden jenseit der Häfen Italiens . . . hat die römische Regierung aufgerüttelt, sie hat das rote Korinth zerstört'.

² *Rome et la Grèce de 200 à 146 avant Jésus-Christ* 622 n. 2.

³ *Polybe ou la Grèce conquise* (1858) 202 (in *Questions historiques*).

⁴ *Klassenkampf, Sozialismus und organischer Staat im alten Griechenland* 40.

⁵ *Geschichte der sozialen Frage und des Sozialismus in der antiken Welt* i 403.

⁶ *CAH* viii 303.

⁷ *SEHWW* 739; cf. also Cary, *A History of the Greek World* 204 f.

⁸ Niese, *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten* iii 337 ff.; Mommsen, *RG* ii⁷ 43 ff.; De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* iv 3, 127 ff.; Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilisation*² 34 f.; Niccolini, *La Confederazione Achea* 189 ff. (for a recent treatment of the political aspects of the war, see Briscoe, *Past and Present* xxxvi [1967] 16 ff.).

⁹ *Opp.* *citt.* in the preceding note. The main sources are: Plb. xxxviii 9-18, cf. xxxix 1-6; iii 32, 2-3; Liv. *Epit.* 1, li, li (P. Oxy.), lii; Paus. vii 14-16, cf. vii 11-13, ii 1.2, 2.2; Diod. xxxii 26. 3-5; Dio Cass. *fr.* 72; Just. xxxiv 1-2, 2.6; Oros. v 3; Zon. ix 31; Str. viii 6.23; Flor. 1.32; Aur. Vict. *Vir. Ill.* lx; Cic. *de leg. agr.* i 5, *de off.* i 35, iii 46; *de imp. Gn. Pomp.* 11; Tac. *Ann.* iv 43; *IG* iv 757, 894, cf. *Syll.*³ 683, 684.

Roman embassy, headed by Sextus Caesar, followed soon. Though more conciliatory in tone, it upheld Orestes' announcement of Rome's policy, demanded cessation of hostilities against Sparta, and satisfaction for the insult to Orestes' legation. The Achaian *strategos*, Kritolaos, toured the cities announcing the League's decision to suspend execution of debts for the duration of the crisis, and stirring up a resistance movement throughout the League. The anti-Roman feelings spread beyond the Peloponnese, Boiotians, Phokians, Euboians, Lokrians and some of the cities in the Corinthian gulf making common cause with the Achaian League. In the spring of 146 B.C. an Assembly of the League was convened at Corinth. A Roman embassy advising moderation was hooted and hustled out of the meeting. Kritolaos carried all before him riding high on the crest of the enthusiasm of the masses. Opposition was completely silenced and war was declared. 'Nominally', says Polybios, 'against Sparta, but really against Rome.' Absolute powers were vested in the *strategoï* for the duration of the war. The first move was made by the Achaians. Kritolaos, with the help of the Boiotians and Chalkidians, invested Herakleia-at-Oita. Then Metellus moved from Macedonia, while the consul for 146 B.C., Lucius Mummius, was ordered to mobilise. Kritolaos backed up on Metellus' approach, but was overtaken and beaten at Skarpheia, in Lokris. Achaian reinforcements were cut to pieces. Central Greece was at Rome's mercy. The courage of the Achaians rose to the occasion. The League, under Diaios, who succeeded Kritolaos, raised a general levy, ordered twelve thousand slaves to be freed and armed, and enjoined a war-tax on the cities. An attempt by the pro-Romans at negotiations was stifled, and the war went on. Metellus, after taking Megara, proposed peace. The Achaians rejected his offer. Shortly after the consul arrived and took over the conduct of the war. His troops moved into the Peloponnese and were deployed against the Achaian forces, based on Corinth. At the Isthmos a decisive battle was fought. The Achaians were defeated after a desperate stand. The remnants of the army dispersed. Mummius took Corinth without resistance. The men were killed, the women and children sold into slavery. The city was sacked and burned, the ground became *ager publicus*. Thebes and Chalkis also suffered heavily, though they were spared the fate of Corinth, the prime mover in the last stand of Greece. All Greek Leagues—or at least all Greek leagues opposed to Rome—were dissolved, democracies were abolished in the cities which took part in the war, and regimes based on a property-census were established. Attempts at changing the thus established constitutions were made punishable with death. The last attempt of the Greeks at freedom from Roman rule was over.

All the references in the sources bearing on our theme centre around the following heads: (a) measures taken by the League with regard to payment of debts; (b) freeing of slaves by the Achaian League; (c) the financial war-effort of the League and the rich; (d) the supporters of the Achaian leadership in 147/6 B.C.

I propose here to discuss these points. The evaluation of the social aspect of the Bellum Achaicum will follow.

(a) *Measures taken by the League with regard to Payment of Debts*

According to Polybios, Kritolaos:

παρήγγειλε τοῖς ἄρχουσι μὴ πράττειν τοὺς ὀφειλέτας μηδὲ παραδέχεσθαι τοὺς ἀπαγομένους εἰς φυλακὴν πρὸς τὰ χρέα, τοὺς <δ> ἐράνους ἐπιμόνους ποιεῖν, ἕως ἂν λάβῃ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου κρίσιν (xxxviii 11.10).

The date is autumn/winter 147 B.C., and the context Kritolaos' tour of the cities of the League to stiffen the resistance to Rome.

First, we should get rid of the impression Polybios tries to create in his account (see also paras. 7–10 and 11), that we have here some private exhortation of Kritolaos to the local magistrates. The political campaigning of Kritolaos and debt-measures may have coincided, but what we have here is not Kritolaos' private venture. It is, I suggest, a ruling of the Achaian League.¹⁰ It has three clauses: (i) *μη πράττειν τοὺς ὀφειλέτας*, (ii) *μη παραδέχεσθαι τοὺς ἀπαγομένους εἰς φυλακὴν πρὸς τὰ χρέα*, (iii) *τοὺς ἐράνοὺς ἐπιμόνοὺς ποιεῖν*. The proviso 'until the war was decided' goes with all three clauses of the ruling. The clauses deal with three different aspects of debt. The first charges the authorities of the cities of the League to suspend the execution of public debts.¹¹ In the second clause the magistrates of the cities were ordered not to receive into custody people brought before them to be arrested for debt. Though the state did not deal with execution of private debts, the creditor could, if the adjudged debt was not repayed, bring the insolvent debtor before the magistrate to be put in custody until repayment.¹² Though our evidence bears on other Greek states, especially Athens, such a practice seems to have obtained also in the cities of the Achaian League, and its suspension is ordered for the duration of the war. The last clause deals with 'eranos-loans', i.e. friendly loans raised by contributions of a group of people for the benefit of an individual. The 'eranos-loan' bore no interest, but its repayment was enforceable by law. According to the ruling of the League, repayment of such loans was to be held over, again for the duration of the war.¹³

On this interpretation the ruling of the Achaian League was a comprehensive and well-thought-out measure. Broadly speaking, it covered the field of financial liability—public debts, private debts and 'eranos-loans'. It was also a fairly circumspect and moderate measure. It certainly was not a revolutionary *χρεῶν ἀποκοπή* since neither capital nor interest were touched upon at all.¹⁴ It is the execution only which is dealt with. It is to

¹⁰ *Παραγγέλλω* is in Polybios, almost uniformly, 'to order', 'to command' and *παραγγελία, παράγγελμα* is 'order', 'command', 'ruling', cf. e.g. i 25.1, 27.8, 34.1; vi 27.1; x 42.3, 49.2. The decision about debt-measures may well have been reached in the meeting at Aigion referred to in xxxviii 10.4 ff. This was probably an Assembly, though the possibility that it was a meeting of the *ἀρχαί* of the League is not to be excluded, cf. Aymard, *Assemblées* 126 with n. 3. At any rate, the ruling had, I suggest, the authority of the League behind it. The language of the passage under discussion gives a strong impression that it is based on documentary evidence.

¹¹ The Greek state was not directly concerned with execution of private debts (see below, on clause ii), but it was concerned with execution of monies owed to the state. The execution was either *ἐκ δίκης* or *καθάπερ ἐκ δίκης* as the case may be; cf. Lipsius, *Att. Recht* 688 f.; *πράττειν* stands here for *πράξις*, on which see e.g. *op. cit.* 689, 712, 936.

¹² See Bonner-Smith, *Administr. of Justice* 275 ff.; Busolt-Swoboda, *Griech. Staatsk.* i 555 f.

¹³ See Jones, *Law and Legal Theory* 171 ff.; Lipsius, *op. cit.* 179 ff., 730; Ziebarth, PW, s.v. *ἔρανος*. In our text *ἔρανος* appears in the well attested sense of 'eranos-loan', or an instalment of such a loan; *τοὺς ἐράνοὺς ἐπιμόνοὺς ποιεῖν* means here 'the instalments are to be held over', 'payments of eranos-loans are to be deferred' (cf. Schweighauser, *Lex. Polyb.* s.v.; Mauresberger, *Polybios-Lexikon* s.v.). See for such sense of *ἐπιμόνος*, Plb. vi 15.6, cf. also Plb. vi 43; *Hermes* xvii (1882) 5 (an inscription from Delos);

[Plat.] *Ax.* 372a; Philo i 179.31; Athen. xv 670d. These measures for dealing with the question of debts have not been adequately explained, and especially the reference to *ἔρανος* was a stumbling-block. Niese, *op. cit.* 345 with n. 1 has 'den Ärmeren daurende Unterstüzungen zu zahlen'; on Mommsen's interpretation, *RG* ii' 45 'alle Klubs permanent sein . . . sollten'; De Sanctis, *op. cit.* 143 with n. 156, though not completely wrong, has a partial and inexact explanation. (A recent treatment of eranos-loans is to be found in J. Vondeling, *Eranos* [Amsterdam 1967]; on our text, pp. 50–51.) It has been recently suggested by Asheri, *Doron* (1967) 85 [in Hebrew] that the payment of *eranos* instalments was to continue and that <δ'> differentiates between suspended and non-suspended payment. However, the <δ'> if we accept the reading, could very well differentiate, say, between execution (clauses i and ii) and payment (clause iii). Moreover, the proviso 'until the war was decided' surely obviates Asheri's interpretation. (Cf. also Feyel, *REG* lvi [1943] 235 ff.)

¹⁴ To be sure, Diod. xxxii 26.3–4 does speak of *χρεῶν ἀποκοπαί*, but the passage (*χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς εἰσηγοῦντο καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν ἀπόρων χρεωφειλετῶν ἔχοντες συνεργοὺς ἀνέσειον τὰ πλῆθη*) is nothing but a rhetorical travesty of the evidence supplied by Polybios. Since Diodoros and Polybios are evidently speaking of the same thing, the Diodoros passage is to be dismissed altogether. With it, Kahrstedt's statement 'alle privatrechtlichen Obligationen wurden abgeschafft' (*Hellas-Jahrb. loc. cit.*) goes overboard.

be delayed temporarily, though of course 'until the war was decided' could not be fixed exactly. This proviso gives us an insight into the purpose of the debt measures. They were conceived with a view to the impending war with Rome, and their objective was to bolster up the war effort of the Achaian League.¹⁵ It goes almost without saying that such an economic relief as envisaged by these measures would make the poor and indebted more willing and able to take part in the overall war effort Achaia was mounting.¹⁶

Having related the measures, Polybios goes on to comment on them: 'After such a demagogic appeal, the common people received everything he [i.e. Kritolaos] said with confidence, and they were ready to obey any order he gave, incapable as they were of taking thought for the future, and enticed by the bait of present favour and relief (*πληθος . . . τῇ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰ χάριτι καὶ ῥαστώνῃ δελεαζόμενον*, xxxviii 11.11).' Polybios' account of the debt measures, based on documentary evidence, is to be clearly distinguished from his comment. The latter is all his own and stems from his hostility to the Achaian leadership and its aims.¹⁷ To be sure, the measures were intended to give economic relief, even if temporary, mainly, though not solely, to the lower classes. Also, they aimed at bolstering the morale of the lower classes and at making them even more enthusiastic about the national cause than they normally were.¹⁸ But they were first and foremost national safety measures, all else being subordinated in the crisis of 147/6 B.C. to the national cause. That the provision with regard to debts had also a social aspect is not to be doubted, but this trait is not to be exaggerated. Any measure changing, even temporarily, the operation of the laws of debt had in Greece a social significance. Also, the leaders of the Achaian League might have been in sympathy with the plight of the lower classes, and might have thought such a relief to be desirable *per se*, in addition to its being salutary to the national war effort. To the lower classes the measures, restricted as they were, might have spelt hope for economic and social betterment, in case of national success.

Be that as it may, the debt measures were moderate, temporary, and—*pace* some modern historians—a far cry indeed from a social revolution.

(b) *Freeing of Slaves by the Achaian League*

Having succeeded Kritolaos as *strategos*, Diaios is said to have ordered, in spring 146 B.C., the freeing of slaves throughout the cities of the Achaian League. The evidence is Polybios xxxviii 15.3–5. It reads: *ἔγραψε ταῖς πόλεσι πάσαις τῶν οἰκογενῶν καὶ παρατρόφων τοὺς ἀκμάζοντας ταῖς ἡλικίας εἰς μυρίους καὶ δισχιλίους ἐλευθεροῦν καὶ καθοπλίσαντας πέμπειν εἰς τὴν Κόρινθον*. Polybios goes on to say that Diaios apportioned the number of slaves to be sent by each city 'as he chose and unfairly, as he always did about other matters' (para. 4); he adds that if the cities had not enough home-reared slaves, they had to supply the deficiency from their other slaves (para. 5).¹⁹ Polybios' disapproval of the measure and its author apart, his account would seem to be based either on documentary evidence or on other detailed evidence.

¹⁵ There was no war with Rome yet, though after the mission of Orestes it must have been regarded by the Achaian leaders as inevitable. But that does not necessarily mean that the Achaian leaders were giving themselves away. The war with Sparta could be a convenient cover. (See Plb. xxxviii 13.6; cf. 15.6.)

¹⁶ De Sanctis may well be right in saying: 'E come in previsione della guerra i creditorì se affrettavano a riscuotere i loro crediti, fece che si accordasse ai debitori una moratoria fino alla soluzione del conflitto imminente', *op. cit.* 143. Thus, the purpose of the mea-

sures could have been not only incentive, but also, as De Sanctis has it, preventive.

¹⁷ On which see below, p. 86.

¹⁸ On the anti-Roman stand of the lower classes in Greece see Fuks, *La Parola del Passato* cxi (1966) 444 f.; also below, p. 84f.

¹⁹ That the slaves were actually manumitted transpires from Plb. xxxviii 15.10 and that liberated slaves took part in the decisive battle at the Isthmos from Paus. vii 16.8. Pausanias refers in a vague way to the freeing of slaves in *καὶ δούλους τε ἐς ἐλευθερίαν ἤφιει*, vii 15.7.

The number of slaves to be manumitted was fixed at twelve thousand. This number was to be divided between the cities of the League; the quotas were certainly based on some estimate of the numbers of the cities' slave population and probably also on their financial capacities. The qualifications of the slaves to be manumitted were carefully specified. The slaves were to be not only home-born (*οἰκογενεῖς*) but also home-reared (*παρατρόφοι*).²⁰ Clearly enough, the manumitted slaves to be incorporated in the League's army were to be as close as possible in upbringing to free-born Achaians.²¹ The manumission of slaves thus conceived and executed was no more a revolutionary 'Liberation of Slaves' (*δούλων ἐλευθέρωσις*) than the debt measures were 'Abolition of Debts'.²² It was an emergency measure taken for military reasons. There might have been some social repercussions as other slaves became restless hoping for manumission in the wake of the freeing of the twelve thousand.²³ But, surely, Diaios was not dealing with the 'Slave Problem', but with an extreme national crisis. The only admissible explanation of the freeing of the slaves is that it was a purely military measure.

(c) *The financial War-Effort of the League and the Rich*

The main source for the financial war-effort of the League is, again, Polybios.²⁴ But here his account of the steps taken and his hostile interpretation of them have to be even more sharply distinguished than was necessary with the debt measures and the freeing of the slaves. Fortunately, the evidence from Polybios is supplemented by an inscription from Troizen, from the time of the Achaian War, which throws light on some important points.²⁵

Polybios relates the financial measures in the context of emergency steps taken by the League after the defeat of the Achaian forces in central Greece; it is preceded by the account of the freeing of slaves and followed by a reference to the ordering of a general levy of all Achaians capable of bearing arms. The financial measures are referred to in the following: *θεωρῶν δὲ [viz. Diaios] τὴν ἀπορίαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς ἰσχυρὰν οὖσαν διὰ τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους γεγόνота πόλεμον, ἐπαγγελίας ποιεῖσθαι συνηγάγκαζε καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν εἰσφέρειν τοὺς εὐπόρους, οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, xxxviii 15.6.*²⁶

The reason for the financial drive is here said to have been 'the exhaustion of the public exchequers in consequence of the war with Sparta'. The exchequers of the cities might have been depleted by the prolonged war with Sparta, but it was not for war against Sparta that the monies were to be raised. By spring 146 B.C. the war with Sparta sank into complete insignificance—it was war with Rome that taxed all resources of the League. The plural, *τὰ κοινά*, would point to the exchequers of the cities, not the common treasury of the League, and *συνηγάγκαζε* would mean here a common drive by the League and the cities' governments to raise money for the war effort.²⁷

The injunctions with regard to Achaia's financial war-effort are stated in *ἐπαγγελίας ποιεῖσθαι καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν εἰσφέρειν τοὺς εὐπόρους*. The sentence does not refer, as is

²⁰ *οἰκογενεῖς* (=vernae) are a well-attested class; *παρατρόφοι* is a ἄπ. λέγ. but the meaning is clear, *παρατρέφω* being 'feed beside (or with) one', 'bring up with', i.e. one's children, cf. e.g. Posid. 36J; Harpocr. s.v. *μόθων*; Men. fr. 866; see also *σύντροφος*. Cf. Westermann, *CP* xi (1945) 4.

²¹ I fail to understand why the number of twelve thousand is to be regarded as excessively large, as it is to Westermann, *Slave Systems* 33 with n. 53, or why he posits 3,500 as the correct number; see Beloch, *Bevölk.* 157 f., cf. also De Sanctis, *op. cit.* 154.

²² Pace Colin, *op. cit.* 662 n. 2 and Kahrstedt, *Hellas-Jahrb.* 111 to whom this is a leaf taken straight from the book of the Social Revolution.

²³ Plb. xxxviii 15.9–10.

²⁴ xxxviii 15.6 to be taken with 8–9 and 11.

²⁵ *IG* iv 757.

²⁶ In para. 8–11, painting a lurid picture of the situation in the Achaian cities, Polybios refers again to the financial steps taken by the League (para. 11); see on it below p. 84.

²⁷ In Polybios, the strategos Diaios is made to be personally responsible for the measures. But it transpires from the Troizen inscription, *IG* iv 757, that there was a resolution of the League's authorities, cf. below p. 83.

commonly supposed, to a single measure, but, I suggest, to two distinct matters, *ἐπαγγελίαι* of corporate bodies, and *εἰσφοραί* of private citizens. *Ἐπαγγελία* is 'offer', 'promise', and in this sense it occurs several times in Polybios.²⁸ It is not necessarily connected with property; when it is, it can denote private as well as public promises of contributions.²⁹ The Troizen inscription, *IG* iv 757, enables us to ascertain what were the *ἐπαγγελίαι* in Achaia in 146 B.C. and how the measure referred to in *ἐπαγγελίας ποιεῖσθαι* was implemented. The inscription is to be dated with certainty in 146 B.C.³⁰ Part one of the inscription (ll. 1-10) is a decree of the Troizenian Assembly, submitted by the Council, with regard to contributions for National Safety; part two (ll. 11-43) is a list of declarations for contributions asked for. Though the first part is mutilated, the decree of the *damos* is repeatedly referred to in lines 11-43, so that we can get a fairly good idea of its contents. A decree concerning National Safety measures was passed by the Achaian League³¹ and it specified the purposes for which the contributions were to be used.³²

Fraenkel, the editor of the inscription in *IG* iv, is eminently right in taking it with Polybios' *ἐπαγγελίας ποιεῖσθαι συνηγάγκαζε* (xxxviii 15.6), and in saying: '(titulus) continet *ἐπαγγελίας*, professiones collationum'. Now, in the long list of contributions preserved there occur *professiones* of *patrai*, *komai*, *thiasoi*, possibly also of *gentes*, but not a single contribution by a private person is recorded. The corporate bodies enumerated in the inscription contributed generously their common funds, land, houses, sacred buildings and other property—in fact, it is often stated in the inscription that they contributed their entire corporate property.³³ Thus, *IG* iv 757 is an inscription dealing with the *ἐπαγγελίαι* referred to by Polybios and it shows that they were requested from, and given by, corporate bodies.

While corporate bodies were asked for contributions, private persons were taxed, and Polybios' repeated use of *εἰσφέρω* may suggest that a property tax, not unlike the *eisphora*, was imposed on owners of taxable property. The payments of the cities to the exchequer of the League are consistently called *εἰσφορά* (or *εἰσφοραί*).³⁴ That might well have been the official name, and it would seem a near supposition that it was, as for instance in Athens, a property tax raised when need arose. Since we do not know exactly how the Achaian taxes were worked out, we cannot tell whether the raising of monies for national defence referred to in the Polybios passage was on the usual lines or not. However, it can hardly be overstressed that what is referred to in Polybios is not expropriation of the rich—whatever impression Polybios tries to create—but, even on his own evidence, a case of taxation, possibly drastic, as the need was extreme.³⁵ Moreover, though Polybios is out to impress

²⁸ See, e.g., i 67.1, 72.6; iii 100.3.

²⁹ See, e.g., Michel, *Recueil* 473.10; *Syll.*³ 577.11.

³⁰ The supposition of Mylonas, *BCH* x (1886) 136 ff., 355 ff., followed by Baunack, *Studien auf d. Gebiete d. griech. Sprache* i 163 ff., that it refers to the situation in 225 B.C., when Kleomenes was about to attack Troizen, had been effectively disposed of by Fraenkel in *IG* iv. The date 146 B.C. had been established by him and is generally accepted. (Recent edition of the inscription, with up-to-date bibliography, in F. G. Maier *Griech. Maurenbauinschriften* [Heidelberg 1959] no. 32)

³¹ καθ' ἑδοξε τῷ κοινῷ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, l.14, cf. ll.32-33.

³² κοινὰ σωτηρία, σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως, διατειχισμὸς τῆς πόλεως, διοικητικαὶ, throughout the inscription.

³³ Fraenkel's 'drecreta (collegiorum) de omnibus suis profundendis pro patria servanda et munienda' would seem to sum it up neatly.

³⁴ See, e.g., Plb. v 91.4, 94.9; iv 60.4, 9; cf. xxiv 2.3; *Syll.*³ 531.33-4. Cf. Aymard, *Assemblées* 166.

³⁵ *Εἰσφέρειν τοὺς ἐπόρους* in the passage under discussion does not show that we have here an action taken against the rich, but that the people without property and the people with property too small to be regarded as taxable, were exempted from the property-tax, as they were in Athens. That women too were to pay (*οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας*) should not surprise at all; in Athens the *eisphora* was paid not only by women property-owners, but also out of the property of orphans. Not least important is *εἰσφέρειν ἡναγκάζοντο παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν προαίρεσιν ὅ, τι τις ἔχειν δόξειεν κ.τ.λ.*, xxxviii 15.11, which has been often badly mistranslated; *αὐτῶν προαίρεσις* is here 'self-assessment'. In Athens the worth of the property was self-assessed for the *eisphora*, though checked by the *epigraphis*. What transpires from the passage is, I suggest, that people were forced to pay contrary to their self-assessment, viz., contrary to what they professed to have. Again, the pointer is to tax, not to confiscations or expropriations.

on the reader that the monies were forcibly extracted from unwilling people, it transpires from his own story in the same context, that there was among the people a spirit of sacrifice for the war effort. 'Women', says Polybios, 'stripping themselves and their children of their jewellery, contributed almost as of a set purpose for their own destruction.' There is no reason to suppose that this spirit was restricted to women, and it would seem reasonable to suppose that those who were economically in a position to contribute to the war effort were contributing freely and voluntarily.³⁶

To sum up, the monies for bolstering the war effort were raised by contributions of corporate bodies, by property-tax, and from voluntary contributions by individuals. The main burden certainly fell on the shoulders of the well-to-do, it could not have been otherwise. But there is not a shred of reliable evidence that there were confiscations, expropriations, or even any dichotomy between rich and poor with regard to the financial war effort of the League.³⁷

The financial measures are fully and satisfactorily explained by the needs of national defence, there is nothing of a socio-revolutionary character in them.

(d) *The Supporters of the Achaian Leadership in 147/6 B.C.*

When mentioning the supporters of the Achaian leadership in the crisis of 147/6 B.C., Polybios and Diodoros use both subjective and objective terms usually employed to denote the lower classes. Polybios uses *πλήθος, ὄχλος, ὄχλοι, οἱ πολλοί*. Once³⁸ those concurring in Kritolaos' and Diaios' views are styled *οἱ χεῖριστοι*. In Diodoros, the leaders themselves were *κατάχρεοι* who stirred up *τὰ πλήθη* and were supported by many poor and indebted (*ἄποροι χρεωφειλέται*).³⁹ Otherwise the supporters of Kritolaos and Diaios are referred to as *πλήθος, ὄχλος*. All this is fairly commonplace. It would warrant the generalised conclusion that to Polybios—Diodoros is here, again, but a travesty of Polybios—the leadership of the League in 147/6 B.C. was supported by the lower classes. But it does not give any real insight into the social composition of those supporting the anti-Roman movement. However, a striking passage in Polybios does give us such an insight. When recounting the proceedings at an assembly of the League, in spring 146 B.C.,⁴⁰ Polybios relates that the people showed no disposition to comply with the proposals of the Roman legates but jeered at them and hooted and hustled them out of the meeting. Then he goes on, as if in explanation of the stand taken by the assembly: *καὶ γὰρ συνηθροίσθη πλήθος ἐργαστηριακῶν καὶ βαναύσων ἀνθρώπων ὅσον οὐδέποτε· πᾶσαι μὲν γὰρ ἐκορύζων αἱ πόλεις, πανδημεὶ δὲ καὶ μάλιστα πως ἢ τῶν Κορινθίων*.⁴¹

Now, *ἐργαστηριακοί* and *βάνανσοι* are much more specific than the out-of-the-drawer designations cited above. *Ἐργαστηριακοί* are those working in the *ergasteria*. Both slaves and free men worked in the factories and workshops of Greece. However, in our context only free workers can be meant. The *ἐργαστηριακοὶ καὶ βάνανσοι* were men from all the cities of the League, not from Corinth alone. It is implied in our text that such men as these had attended assemblies before, though never in such great numbers. Clearly, the

³⁶ xxxviii 15.11.

³⁷ Kahrstedt, the most extreme exponent of the view that the monies needed were raised by ruthless confiscations and expropriations, speaks of 'Ausrottung der Bourgeoisie' (*Hellas-Jahrb.* 111; *GGA* 121 f.). That is going even beyond the false impression Polybios tried to give. The only scholar who got the right feel of the situation was De Sanctis, *op. cit.* 154: 'la popolazione andò di per sè incontro ai desiderî del governo' etc.

³⁸ xxxviii 10.8.

³⁹ xxxii 26.3-5.

⁴⁰ xxxviii 12.5.

⁴¹ *loc. cit.* For the date see Aymard, *Assemblées* 121 with n. 1. Aymard, *op. cit.* 120 ff. argues, against Beloch, *GG* iv 2,234, that the assembly was a *synodos*, not a *synkletos*; the latter possibility is, however, certainly not to be excluded. Larsen, *Repr. Govern.* 187 f. argues that it was 'a *synodos* and a *synkletos* combined'. (For some remarks on the proceedings see also Pédech, *La méthode historique de Polybe* 293, 295; also Welwei, *Historia* xv [1966] 298.)

reference can be only to citizens from the cities of the League.⁴² A reference to the revolution of Apollodoros in Kassandreia helps to define the *ergasteriakoi* of our text. Apollodoros is said by Polyainos to have succeeded in his *coup* after having roused *οικέτας καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐργαστηρίων τεχνίτας* and the *ἐργαστηριακοί* of our text are to be identified with the *ἀπὸ ἐργαστηρίων τεχνῖται*.⁴³ While *ἐργαστηριακοί* is specific, the term *βάνουσοι* is an overall designation of the working men, including artisans, semi-skilled workers, unskilled wage-earners, people occupied in a small way in commerce, and excluding those working the land.⁴⁴ Strictly speaking, the 'craftsmen from the factories' are included in the *banausoι*; they have been singled out by Polybios because they must have been prominent in the assembly at Corinth. They would be especially prominent among the Corinthians in the assembly, Corinth being at that time the great centre of industry and commerce in Greece.⁴⁵ Thus, the great body of the supporters of Kritolaos and Diaios, and of their policies, were the city working men, the poor and the debtors.⁴⁶ These were, basically, the classes in which the national, anti-Roman movement, found support all over Greece from the early second century B.C. onwards.⁴⁷ The national proclivities of the masses might well have been enhanced in 147/6 in Achaia by the debt moratorium, and by the consequent hopes for social betterment, dependent on national success.⁴⁸ Thus, men of the lower classes packed the assembly of spring 146 B.C. to support the policies of the League's leaders. 'All the cities indeed', goes on Polybios, having stated who were the supporters of the Achaian leadership, 'were in a drivelling state (*ἐκορύζων αἱ πόλεις*), but the malady was universal and most fierce at Corinth.'⁴⁹ The expression *πόλεις ἐκορύζων* strongly recalls *πόλις νοσοῦσα* often used in classical literature to denote a state out of joint, plunged into internal strife.⁵⁰ Since the anti-Roman movement was to Polybios a *ἀμάρτημα* of the worst kind,⁵¹ it can be supposed that the enthusiasm of the masses for the anti-Roman policies of the League's leaders is the *malaise* alluded to. That, however, may be only a partial explanation. As tension between Achaia and Rome mounted, from 150 B.C. onwards, the lower classes throughout the cities of the League were gaining new prominence and weight as the mainstay of the national movement. In the critical assembly of spring 146 B.C. men of the lower classes took part in numbers never heard of before, and, though it was not they alone who were responsible for the resolutions adopted,⁵² their role in the assembly at Corinth was certainly very important. Thus it may well be that the cities were to Polybios in a state of *malaise* because *ἐργαστηριακοὶ καὶ βάνουσοι ἄνθρωποι* became a power in the League, previously dominated by the well-to-do.⁵³ Be that as it may, the war-movement was closely bound up with the lower classes. It was their wholehearted support of Diaios, Kritolaos and their party which gave momentum to the movement, indeed, made the last

⁴² They would be members of delegations from the cities, if the assembly described was a *synodos*, or men freely coming to Corinth, if it was a *synkletos*. Had there been any suspicion of slave-workers in *ergasteria* having slipped into the Assembly, say, from Corinth itself, Polybios would surely have pounced on it.

⁴³ Polyain. *Strat.* vi 7.2, cf. Fuks, *Parol. del Pass.* cxi (1966) 443 f. The *οἱ ἐργαστηριακοὶ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὄχλος* in Diod. xxxi 25.1 are 'operarii ac reliqua forensis turba' (edition Firmin-Didot).

⁴⁴ Cf. Fuks, *CQ* xviii (1968) 214 with n. 6.

⁴⁵ Similarly, the lower classes in the Syracusan Assembly, which passed 'Redistribution of Land' in 356 B.C., are styled *ὁ ναυτικός ὄχλος καὶ βάνουσοι* since the naval crowd was the most prominent; cf. Fuks, *ibid.*

⁴⁶ On the debtors see above, on xxxviii 11.10-11,

especially on the *ῥαστώνη* given them by the debt moratorium. For the lower classes of Corinth, see Lenschau, PW, s.v. Korinthos 1033.

⁴⁷ See *Parol. del Pass.* cxi (1966) 444 ff.

⁴⁸ See above p. 81.

⁴⁹ xxxviii 12.5.

⁵⁰ Polybios in a nearly parallel context, when characterising the anti-Roman party, says of them *πλήθος νοσοῦν καὶ διεφθαρμένον*, xxxviii 10.7; for *κορύζω* see Plat. *R.* 343a; Luc. *D. Mort.* 20.4; Hesych, s.v. *κορυζάω*. For *νοσεῖν* in a political sense cf. e.g., Soph. *Ant.* 1015; Eur. *Hel.* 581; Dem. ii 14; Hdt. v 28.

⁵¹ xxxviii 3.12; see also, below p. 86.

⁵² See below p. 88f.

⁵³ The predominance of the well-to-do in the Achaian League is well put by von Fritz, *The Theory of the Mixed Constitution* 5 ff.

stand possible at all. And the fact that their hopes for economic and social betterment went along with hopes for national independence added impetus to their anti-Roman feelings. That the lower classes were the mainstay of Achaia's last stand was recognised not only by Polybios but also by Rome. Having crushed Achaia, Rome 'put down democracies and established governments based on property qualifications';⁵⁴ to change the new constitutions, which prevented any influence of the lower classes in government, was punishable with death.⁵⁵ It was Rome's answer to a long series of social and national anti-Roman movements in Greece based on the lower classes which preceded the Achaian War;⁵⁶ and, one would think, also a direct response to the part played by the lower classes in the *Bellum Achaicum*. However, it does not follow that the *Bellum Achaicum* was a war of the lower classes to shake off the Roman yoke and to improve their economic-social plight. In spite of the weighty role played by the lower orders, the *Bellum Achaicum* was a national war, a war of the Achaian people, not a class movement.

To Polybios Achaia's last war was 'folly and madness' (*ἄνοια καὶ μανία*). It was rooted in an erroneous policy of long standing which stemmed from the ignorance and ill-will of the League's leaders (. . . *πάλαι προκειμένη . . . ἄγνοια . . . δι' ἀπειρίαν καὶ κακίαν τῶν κρατούντων*). These 'empty heads with empty notions' (*κενὰ κενοὶ λογίζονται*) who think that 'what is obvious is surprising' (*τὰ πρόδηλα παράδοξα*) did everything that was in their power to bring about the total destruction of Achaia.⁵⁷ 'Tyche' saved Achaia; using, like a skilful wrestler, the only device left to her by the folly of the leaders of the Greeks, who took every means and every opportunity to expel her, she brought about the speedy discomfiture and easy defeat of the Greeks. People kept repeating after the war the proverb, 'Had we not perished so soon we would never have been saved', and they were right.⁵⁸ The line taken by the League's leaders, particularly Kritolaos and Diaios, was the worst possible. Their party was composed of men who were a deliberate selection of 'the worst men from each city, the most god-forsaken and the greatest corrupters of the nation' (*οἱ χείριστοι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἐχθροὶ καὶ λυμαινόμενοι τὸ ἔθνος*). The masses they stirred up and enticed to follow their lead were 'ill-conditioned and demoralised' (*[πλήθος] νοσοῦν καὶ διεφθαρμένον*). And they dragged the 'unhappy nation' (*ταλαίπωρον ἔθνος*) to war against an unwilling Rome, and thus to the greatest catastrophe in Greek history. This is Polybios' conception of the *Bellum Achaicum*, and he tries hard—and rather successfully, at least with modern scholars—to put it over.⁵⁹ However, it transpires from Polybios' own story—in spite of his avowal of truthfulness in xxxviii 4.1–5—that Achaia's last effort was a truly national movement, contrary to what he is out to depict. And this is supported by some evidence independent of Polybios.

That it was Rome, not the Achaian leaders, who brought about the war is above reasonable doubt. The ruling of the Senate, delivered by Orestes, was no doubt tantamount

⁵⁴ Paus. vii 16.9; cf. Accame, *Il dominio Romano* 9 f., 33 ff.; Larsen, *Economic Survey* iv 306 ff.; Münzer, *PW* s.v. Mummius, Nachträge 1199 ff.; Busolt-Swoboda, *Staatsk.* 1547 f. with notes. Cf. also Passerini, *Athenaeum* xi (1933) 330.

⁵⁵ *Syll.*³ 684.19 ff.

⁵⁶ Such as the revolutionary rule of Nabis, the revolution in Argos in 197–5 B.C., the social conflict and anti-Roman movement and Antiochos III, the social conflict and anti-Roman movement and Perseus, social troubles in Aitolia in 174–3 B.C.; social troubles in Thessaly in 174–3 B.C., social troubles in Perrhaebia in 173 B.C., social struggle in Macedonia

in 168/7–143/2 B.C. (including the revolts of Andriskos and of Pseudo-Philip); full reference will be supplied in my book *A History of the Social Conflict in late Classical and Hellenistic Greece*, now in preparation.

⁵⁷ xxxviii 18.8, 10.12–13, 16.11, 18.11–12.

⁵⁸ xxxviii 18.8–12.

⁵⁹ xxxviii 10.8, 10.7, 10.12, also xxxviii 3, 9.4, 10.5–7, 11.1, 11.7–11, 13.8, 16.7, 17.9–10; iii 5.6. Polybios is most successful with the most recent writer on the subject, Lehmann, *Unt. z. hist. Glaubwürdigkeit d. Polybios* (1967) 322 ff.; Lehmann's account is on this point an offence to good sense.

to a deliberate breaking up of the Achaian League, immediate, or to follow, and no amount of explaining away by Polybios can obscure this.⁶⁰ The choice given by Rome to Achaia was dissolution of the League or resistance. The Achaian leaders chose the latter. That this stand was shared by the great majority of the Achaians, class distinctions being irrelevant, comes out in some passages in Polybios himself.

The Assembly of spring 146 B.C. was, according to Polybios, attended by people of the lower classes in much greater numbers than ever before.⁶¹ There is no valid reason to disbelieve him, but, in view of the situation, it must have been a generally well attended meeting, the unusual feature being that the proportion of lower classes was higher than usual. Now, Polybios himself states that there were in the Assembly people who did not take the anti-Roman stance, but they were few.⁶² Also some of those in office were opposed to the policies of the anti-Roman leaders. Kritolaos accused them of collusion with Rome, and carried all before him.⁶³ The Assembly voted war. The impression gained from Polybios himself is that the great majority of the assembled people was for war, and that those who opposed the League's leaders were but, in De Sanctis' words, 'una minoranza esigua'.⁶⁴

What we learn from Polybios about Diaios putting down the pro-Roman opposition points in the same direction.⁶⁵ Though Polybios certainly scraped together every possible piece of evidence, it all adds up to astonishingly little. There is a strong impression that the opposition was insignificant and easily dealt with. That a great majority was behind the League's policies may be deduced from it.⁶⁶

Finally, two passages in Polybios which run contrary to the impression he is out to create. 'As all this was happening at one and the same time', says Polybios referring to the implementation of Diaios' emergency measures, 'the consternation created by the particular events of every day rendered people incapable of that general and careful reflection, which would have made them foresee that they with their wives and children were all clearly on the road to ruin (<δ<)ότι πάντες εἰς πρόδηλον ὄλεθρον ἄγονται μετὰ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν). So, as if carried away and swept down by the force of a fierce torrent (ὑπὸ χειμάρρου τινὸς λάβρου) they followed the demented and perverse guidance of their leader (ἐπηκολούθουν τῇ τοῦ προεστῶτος ἀγνοίᾳ καὶ παρακοπῇ).'⁶⁷ This is not, whatever Polybios wanted it to be, a picture of a nation dragged unwillingly into war by war-leaders, nor is it a picture of a nation terrified and dragged into war by the lower classes. What emerges from this palimpsest is

⁶⁰ For context see above p. 78f; Paus. vii 14, cf. Dio fr. 72; Liv. *Epit.* li; Just. xxxiv 1-2; Eutr. iv 14; Flor. i 32; Zon. ix 31. Polybios xxxviii 9.5-8 tries to explain it away by saying that the mild line adopted by the embassy of Sextus (above p. 79) shows 'that they did not wish to dissolve the League but to alarm the Achaians and to deter them from acting in a presumptuous and hostile manner . . . they thought fit to alarm the Achaians and curb their undue arrogance, but by no means wished to go to war with them . . .'. However, the embassy of Sextus was, certainly, as firm about the freedom of constituent members to leave the Achaian League as was that of Orestes. Rome would, possibly, prefer breaking up the League without war, but that does not mean that the war was not her doing. The Roman feeling of guilt is to be seen in Cic. *de imp. Gn. Pomp.* 11; *de off.* iii 46; see also Niese iii 345; Hill, *The Roman Middle Class* 99 sq.

⁶¹ See above pp. 84-6.

⁶² *ἀλλήλοις δέ τισι κ.τ.λ.*, xxxviii 12.6, cf. 12.7 and 13.1-3.

⁶³ *Ibid.* 3-5 and 7.

⁶⁴ *op. cit.* 144.

⁶⁵ xxxviii 17-18.

⁶⁶ De Sanctis (*op. cit.* 153) is, I think, again eminently right in saying 'la prova [i.e. of the almost general support for the policies of the leaders] sta nella misura limitatissima delle repressioni cui il partito nazionale ebbe a ricorrere per assicurarsi dal tradimento' (cf. 'Polibio, pur così avverso a Dio, non sa cettare che la uccisione di Sosicrate e quello del corinzio Fileno coi figli', n. 179). With regard to the national party's alleged ruthlessness, the main accusation by Polybios is of what they would have done to their opponents had the war been longer (xxxviii 18.10-12), not of what they actually did. Mommsen's 'Militärdiktatur', as well as the lurid pictures drawn by Kahrstedt and Pöhlmann are wholly wrong. Niese, *op. cit.* 348 f., is here refreshingly sober.

⁶⁷ xxxviii 16.1-2.

rather a picture of a nation following (*ἐπηκολούθουν*) its leaders in a desperate war against tremendous odds.

A passage towards the end of the preserved account of the war is no less revealing. In xxxviii 17–18 Polybios tells the story of the allegedly ruthless putting down of the pro-Romans, laying all the guilt on Diaios and his men. But then comes an outburst: *τοιαύτης δὲ τῆς ἀνοίας καὶ τῆς ἀκρισίας συμβαινούσης περὶ πάντας . . . δῆλον ὡς εἰκότως ἂν τις ἐπιζητήσῃ πῶς οὐκ ἄρδην ἀπώλοντο πάντες*.⁶⁸ So, all were guilty, except the few pro-Romans. That is rather far from the scheme Polybios puts over throughout.⁶⁹ Some pieces of evidence independent of Polybios point the same way.

The ruling of the Senate with regard to the right of secession for the members of the League was announced by Aurelius Orestes to the magistrates of the cities, who were summoned to come along with Diaios.⁷⁰ This is a rather unusual form for announcing the Senate's policy to the Achaian League. Possibly Rome preferred those to the *archai* of the League whose anti-Roman stand was known. At any rate, it was the notables from all the cities of the League who were present, not people of the lower classes. Now, the reaction of those convened by Orestes was unmistakable. 'They did not even wait for Orestes to conclude, but . . . ran out of the house and summoned the Achaians to an Assembly.'⁷¹ And though the riot that followed cannot, perhaps, be laid at the notables' door, their angry and spontaneous reaction to Rome's ruling certainly does not bear out the view that the higher orders were pro-Roman while the lower classes took a nationalistic stand. The pro-Roman faction is not even mentioned in this connexion.⁷²

Two inscriptions allow us a glimpse of Achaia in its extreme crisis. They do not fit into Polybios' scheme of the Achaian War.

We have already dealt in some detail with *IG* iv 757, a list of contributions by *collegia* in Troizen to the national defence.⁷³ The impression given by this inscription—and one cannot speak of more than impressions in such a context—is that the response to the appeal of the League was at Troizen both willing and generous.⁷⁴

The other inscription, *IG* iv 894, from Epidaurus, possibly reflects feelings in Achaia after the débâcle. Having strained every sinew to raise the greatest army they ever put in the field, and having been defeated, 'the cities'—to quote Tarn—'set up their rolls of honour, and we happen to possess that of Epidaurus, 156 dead in the battle from one small town. . . . Achaea had no cause to be ashamed of her last fight, and she was not ashamed'.⁷⁵

The Bellum Achaicum has a distinct social colouring primarily because the lower classes, the *ἐργαστηριακοὶ καὶ βάνανσοι*, fully identified themselves with the fight against Rome, for reasons which were both national and socio-economic. Also, because some of the measures taken by the League during the conflict had distinct socio-economic implications, even if their objectives were those of national defence. But the Achaian war against Rome

⁶⁸ xxxviii 18.7.

⁶⁹ See also xxxviii 15.11, above p. 84, on the acts of voluntary sacrifice by women, not of the lower classes, for the national defence fund.

⁷⁰ Paus. vii 14.1: <ὁ δὲ> τοὺς τε ἐν ἐκάστη τῇ πόλει ἔχοντας τὰς ἀρχάς κ.τ.λ., cf. Just. xxxiv 1.6. (Larsen, *Repr. Govern.* 185 ff. takes the men, following Niccolini, *La Confederazione Achea* 191 n. 1, to be the *damiurgoi* of the League; this seems to be rather doubtful; see also Busolt-Swoboda, *Staatsk.* 1546.)

⁷¹ Paus. vii 14.2.

⁷² Paus. vii 14.2 ff.; see above p. 78f; cf. Liv. *Epit.* li, lii, Dio *fr.* 72.

⁷³ Above, p. 83f.

⁷⁴ It may be worth noting that Baunack, *Stud. auf d. Gebiete d. griech. u. arisch. Sprachen* 163, though not interested in questions discussed here, and historically misplacing the inscription (see note 30), comments: 'gross ist die patriotische Opfernwilligkeit ganzer Körperschaften'; cf. also Tarn, *Hell. Civ.*² 35: 'at Troezen, and doubtless elsewhere, the members put all their property at the city's disposal . . . feeling ran like a torrent'.

⁷⁵ *op. cit.* 35. However, only 52 in the list are Epidaurian citizens, the rest are 'Αχαιοὶ καὶ σύννοικοι. The overall number of Achaian casualties in the war might have been as high as twenty thousand, cf. Larsen, *Economic Survey* iv 305.

was first and foremost a national struggle for independence. The division in Achaia in 147/6 B.C. was not bipartite—it was not: the lower classes for the national movement, the upper orders against it. The overwhelming majority of the Achaians, disregarding class differences, went along with the independence movement, and only a small and insignificant minority was against it.

The Achaian League decided to go to war, fought a war, and lost a war.

‘It could do nothing else, unless a small country has no right to fight for its liberties against a big one.’⁷⁶

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⁷⁶ Tarn, *ibid.*